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COMMENTS
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS: NON-RESIDENTS
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE FORUM
INTRODUCTION
State jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents
has a long history of litigation in the Supreme Court of thc United States.1
A careful study of the decisions reveals that the Court has gradually
expanded its concept of the permissible scope of state jurisdiction.
2 The
importance of this trend cannot be overemphasized when viewed in
relation to the rapid technological and economic development of the
United States. The purpose of this comment is to examine the present
status of a small segment of the overall problem-the power of a state to
acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident not present within the
forum, by substituted service of process, where the cause of action has
arisen as a result of business contacts of the nonresident within the state.3




rrhe problem must be examined in the light of its historical development.
The Supreme Court in 1877, in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff,5 formulated
the rule that absent a voluntary appearance or consent to be served, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required personal service
1. E.g., Corporations: McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220L 1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S, 643 (1950); International Shoe
o. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also HENDERSON, THE POSITION oF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. C. V (1918).
Individuals: Doherty & Co. v, Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); lIess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also dicta McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra,
and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra.
2. See discussion in Elinan, Blithe Spirit-.'lhe Foreign Corporation In The
Michigan Courts, 35 U.DeT. L. J. 281(1958). See also McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co. supra note i, at 222 (in the words of Black, J., "Looking back over this long
history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over6 foreign corporations and other nonresidents.")
3. If a state does not have the power to acquire personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident (exceeding its jurisdictional limitations) then the attemspt to assert the
power is invalid under the U. S. CoNsr. amcnd. XIV, § 1, which states: "[Nior shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; . . ." Judgments obtained where a state attempts to acquire personal jurisdiction
in violation of § I of the XIV amendment, supra, will not be entitled to the "full
faith and credit" required by the U. S. CONs'r. art. 4, § 1.
4. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957).
5. 95 U. S. 314 (1877).
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of a nonresident individual defendant within the forum to give a state
jurisdiction to render an in personam judgment. Thus was enunciated the
requirement of "presence" for individuals which later was applied to
foreign corporations.6 The failure of the Court to clearly limit the require-
ment of physical presence to cases where the nonresident had no other
contacts with the state of the forum led many legislatures to enact substituted
service statutes to circumvent the supposed "due process" requirement of
the decision? Subsequent decisions of the Court engrafted many limitations
upon the "presence" test,8 culminating in its abandonment in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. Having abandoned "presence" as essential to
"due process" in acquiring jurisdiction in actions in personam, the more
nebulous test of "minimum contacts" was advanced.10 "Minimum contact"
was reached in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.," decided by the
Court in 1957. In the words of justice Black, "It is sufficient for purposes
of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that state."'12 (Emphasis added.) "Due process" is thus
the key which opens the jurisdictional lock of a state as to a nonresident
defendant.
What is the "due process" requirement that the Court so often
discusses? Is it a legal standard for which the Court fixes the determinative
criteria, or is it a criterion by which the Court determines its own ever
shifting legal standard? The suspicion persists that the latter premise is
correct. Legislation, however, must be designed upon the former. This is
the basis of the so-called "doing business" statutes which have been
enacted by a great majority of the states to enable them to secure personal
jurisdiction over absent nonresidents where a cause of action arises out
of the business contacts of the nonresident within the state of the forum. 3
6. E.g., Louisville & N. R. R. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320 (1929); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S.
529 (1883); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882).
7. E.g., ALA. CODE, Tit. 7, § 199 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1953); ARK. STAT.
§ 27-340 (1957); FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957); Miss. ConE. § 1437 (1942). See also.
Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems And Mfoder Trends, 5
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 198, 199 (1958).
8. E.g., Milliken v. Meyers, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The Court upheld a
personal judgment of a Wyoming court against a domiciliary who had been personally
served in Colorado. See also, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) where the Court
upheld the validity of a Massachusetts' statute wherein a nonresident using the state's
highways was held to have impliedly consented to appointment of the secretary of
state as agent in the state to receive service of process in proceedings growing out of
accidents on a highway in which the nonresident was involved.
9. 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
10. Id. at 316.
11. 355 U. S. 220 (1957).
12. Id. at 223.
13. The "doing business" theory was formulated in Philadelphia & R.Ry. v.
Me Kiblen, 243 U. S. 264 (1917) as a test for determining the "presence" of a
corporation within a state.
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DOING BUSINESS WITIIIN THE FORUM As A BASIS
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
Many jurisdictions have enacted substituted service statutes whereir,
the justification of the state's jurisdiction is the business of the nonresident
conducted within the forum.' 4 These legislative enactments fall within
two broad classifications: those regulating "special type businesses,"',5 and
those concerned with the doing of business generally by a nonresident
within the state.'6 Statutes within the first category have been held to be
within the purview of the state's police power,' or to constitute a valid
exercise of a state's power to regulate a business which it "treats as
exceptional and subjects to special regulation.""'
It is primarily with the second type statute, and jurisdiction thereunder,
that the controversies have continued to rage.' 9 They depend for their
constitutional efficacy upon whether the state's application of its "doing
business" statute constitutes a compliance with the "due process" clause
of the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by the Court.20 What does
the Supreme Court consider arc the permissible limits of a state's in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident "doing business' therein, and
what constitutes "doing business" to effectuate such jurisdiction?
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations Doing Business Within a State.
Under the common law, jurisdiction over a foreign corporation could
not be obtained in an action in personam in the absence of a voluntary
submission to a state's jurisdiction; the corporation was deemed to have
legal existence only in the state creating it.21 State legislatures circum-
14. See notes 15 and 16 infra.
15. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 625.30 (1957) (insurance); IND. STAT. ANN. § 42-1803
197 Supp.) (collection agencies); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 227 §§5, 5A (1955)
eonstruction work); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-139 (1950) (advertising securities within
state); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.14 (1) (1946) (violation of "blue sky" law).
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODF, Tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1953); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-340(1957); FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957); 'rNN. CODE,. ANN. §§ 20-221-223 (1954).
17. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935). Cf. Hall v. Ceiger-Jones
Co., 242 U. S. 538 (1917). See also, Scott, Business lurisdiction Over Non Residents,
32 HARV. L. REv. 871(1919).
18. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220 (1957).
19. See, e.g., Robbins v. Benjamin Air Rifle Co., 209 F. 2d 173 (5th Cir. 1954);
Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton & Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Impaco v.
Lauro, 129 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1955); Mulhern v. Gerald, 116 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Mass. 1953); Forsgren v. Gellioz, 110 F. Supp. 647 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Armi v.
Huckabee, 266 Ala. 91, 94 So. 2d 380 (1957); Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,
215 Ark. 630, 222 S. V. 2d 820 (1949); Wm. E. Strasser Const. Corp. v. Linn,
97 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1957); Guardian Indemnity Corp. v. Harrison, 74 So. 2d 371 (Fla.
1954); Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953); McGuff v. Charles Antell,
Inc., 256 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1953).
20. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See text p. 208intro.
21. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (1839). Taney, C. J. stated the rule
at 588: "IA] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by
force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory,
the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in its place of creation, and
cannot migrate to another sovereignty."
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vented the common law rule by requiring a foreign corporation's consent
to be "found" within its territory for the purpose of service of process
as a condition to its doing business within the state. 22 The statutes required
that consent be manifested by the appointment of a local agent to receive
service. Such statutes were ineffective where a corporation transacted busi-
ness within the state without expressly appointing an agent.23 The Supreme
Court, in Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French ,2' resolved this difficulty by holding
that consent to service of process upon an agent of the corporation
designated by the statute was "implied" if the corporation transacted
business within the state and refused to appoint an agent.
The Court subsequently abandoned the "implied consent" test and
applied the Pennoyer v. Neff requirement of service of process within
the forum to foreign corporations. 25  Since corporations could only be
present by the activities of its agents, due process required that the
corporation be doing business within the state before the agent could be
considered "present" for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction.
What Constitutes a Foreign Corporation Doing Business Within A State?
Prior to the International Shoe Co. decision26 it was necessary to
establish that the foreign corporation was "present" in order to give the
state jurisdiction. "Doing business" constituted presence only where there
was "continuous and systematic activity."27 Isolated acts were not enough.28
Mere "solicitation" of business within a state without more did not
constitute doing business,2"9 but "solicitation plus" established the presence
of the corporation within the forun 33 A defendant foreign corporation's
22. Ex parte Schollenburger, 96 U. S. 369 (1877). Sec generally ScoTT, F-nA-
NIENIALS Or PROCEDURE IN AC[TIONS AT LAW 52-54 (1]922).
23. IENDERSON, supra note 1.
24. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
25. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1883).
26. 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
27. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914);
Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S.
(18 flow.) 404 (1856).
28. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918) (where
the Court stated: "As to the continued practice of advertising its wares in Louisiana,
and sending its soliciting agents into that State, we think the previous decisions of
this Court have settled the law to be that such practices did not amount to that
doing of business which subjects the corporation to the local jurisdiction for the purpose
of service of process upon it.) (Emphasis added.); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson,
113 U.S. 727 (1885) (A corporation of Ohio contracted in Colorado to manufacture
machinery at its place of business in Ohio and to deliver it in Ohio. feld, this act
did not constitute carrying on of business in Colorado.
29. Green v. Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. Co., 205 US. 530 (1906) (hiring an office
and employment of an agent for the solicitation of freight and passenger traffic, not
doing business). See also Macuines v. lFontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257 F. 2d 832
(2d Cir. 1958).
30. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Authorized
agents' solicitation of orders, receipt of payments for the company and the taking of
customers notes, etc. constituted doing business in Kentucky. But see, Green v, Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., supra note 29.
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ownership of a subsidiary "doing business" within a state did not equal
business activity of the parent 3' unless the subsidiary was the agent,
32
or they were in reality not separate entities.
33
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington3 4 the Court adopted a
liberalized concept of the jurisdictional basis of doing business, stating:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'a' (Emphasis added.)
This "minimum contacts" concept, after being reaffirmed in two subsequent
decisions, 31 has recently been extended in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co.37 In this case the beneficiary, a resident of California, sued a
foreign insurance corporation to recover on a reinsurance contract, accepted
in California and delivered there to the insured who was a resident of
that state. The insurer, a Texas corporation, had no agents or offices in
California. The California court based its jurisdiction on a state statute
which subjected foreign corporations to suits in California on insurance
contracts with residents of that state even though such corporations could
not be served with process within its borders. Service of process was by
registered mail. The California court entered a default judgment against
the insurer. Suit to enforce the judgment was filed in Texas, the domicile
of the corporation. The Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment
holding that it violated due process under the fourteenth amendment
because service of process outside of California could not give that state
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. In reversing the Texas court,
Justice Black stated:
[T]he Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court
rom entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient
for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with that State .... The contract
was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there
and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It
cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay. 8 (Emphasis added.)
31. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahv Pack. Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925); Harris v.
Deere and Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1956). See Notes 34 Tsx. L. RFv. 946 (1956);
1956 Wis. L. REv. 668.
32. See, e.g., Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp .865 (W.D. Mo. (1948).
33. Cf. Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Stipp. 376 (V.D,
Ark.,0 1951
34. 32 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. Id. at 316.
36. Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 634 (1950).
37. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
38. id. at 223.
1958]
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The implications of this decision cannot be overestimated. Admittedly
this was an action arising out of the regulation of a business that the
state treated as exceptional and subjected to restrictive legislation. But Justice
Black's opinion does not suggest that this is a special rule to be applied
to insurance companies. The Court approved cases which did not involve
insurance contracts, thus indicating by implication that the same rule would
be applied to other nonresidcnts. 911
Nonresident Natural Persons Doing Business Within a State
as a Basis of Jurisdiction
A natural person cannot be excluded from doing business within a
state upon the basis of nonrcsidcnce alone.40 Consequently it might be
argued that the "doing busincss" concept has no jurisdictional basis as
to them. The Court sustained the validity of this argument in Flexner v.
Farson,4' decided in 1919. However, with the cstablishmcnt of "contacts"
as a jurisdictional test there is no reason to believe that the Court would
not hold doing business within the forum to constitute a jurisdictional
basis applicable alike to corporations and natural persons.42 That this is a
39. 'Fhe Court in support (if its conclusion that: "It is sufficicnt for purposes
of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection
with lCalifonial that State," cited in a footnote the following cases which do not
involve insurance contracts: Conspaina de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md.
237, 107 A2d 357 (1954), cart. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1954) (Maryland Court of
Appeals held that Maryland statute providing that a foreign corporation shall be
subject to an action in the state by a resident or person having a usual place of
business in the state, on a cause of action arising out of any contract made within
the state, was not a denial of due process as applied to a Panamanian Corporation
on a contract made in Maryland where the contract specifically provided that the
substantive law of Maryland was to be applied); S. Howes Co. v. XV. P. Milling Co.,
277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954) (Oklahoma Supreme Court held nonresident manufacturing
corporation subject to jnrisdiction of Oklahoma court in action auising out of breach
of warranty of fitness of machine which manufacturer had sold to Oklahoma resident.
Commission broker in Oklahoma suggested purchase and sent order to manufacturer
for acceptance. Manufacturer accepted order, and shipped machine direct to customer
routed in accordance with brokers' directions. A salesman was later sent to correct
defects complained of by the customer. ''he court held the corporation was "engaging
in or transacting business" within the meaning of the state statute subjecting foreign
corporations "doing business" in Oklahoma to local process); Smyth v. Twin State
improvement Co., 116 Vt. 559, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (Vermont Supreme Court held
Vermont statute, which provides that a foreign corporation commiting a tort in
Vermont against a resident of that state shall be deemed to be doing business therein
and to have appointed secretary of state as agent for service of process in any action
growing out of such tort, was not violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See also ~rESTTIr:NT (SECOND) CoNmiciC or LAws §§ 88.92 (1958).
40. Holmnes, J., in Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 389 (1919) stated: "The state
[Kentuckyl had no power to exclude the defendants and on that ground without going
farther the Supreme Court of Illinois rightly held . . . that tle Kentucky judgment
was void." Exclusion on the basis of nonresidency is violative of the "privileges and
immunities" clause of the fourteeith amendimncit tn the Constitutionn. Cf. Douglas, 1.
concurring opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
41. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
42. Rs'TA'TEMEN'r (SHcoND), CoNFIcT OF LAws § 85 (1958). BEALF, '['nHi
CONFLICT OF LAws § 84.3 (1935 ed.). See also, McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations: Actions Arising Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 COLUM. L.
REv. 331, 337 (1946).
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valid assumption is indicated by the decisions in Doherty 6 Co. v.
Goodman,43  International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"4  and McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co.
4
1
A number of states have passed substituted service statutes which
purport to subject nonresident individuals who do business within the
state to the jurisdiction of their courts.4" If these statutes provide for
adequate notice to the nonresident defendant, 4 and the state courts adopt
an attitude of reasonableness in regard to the convenience of the forum,48
there is no denial of "due process," when a state requires a nonresident
individual to defend a suit where the cause of action arises out of the
business conducted within the state.4 9
Substituted Service and What Constitutes Doing Business in Florida:
The Florida Statute
The Florida statute as amended by the legislature5" is comprehensive
in scope. The statute as first enacted subjects,
any person .. .a co-partnership or any other type of association,
who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign
corporations, and any person who is a resident of the state and
who subsequently becomes a nonresident [who accepts] the
privilege extended by law . . . to operate, conduct, engage in, or
carry on a business or business venture within the state ...
to acceptance of the appointment of the secretary of state as their agent
to accept service of process,
in any action, suit or proceeding against them, . . .arising out of
any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to such
business venture ...
43. 294 U.S. 623 (1935) ('The Supreme Court upheld a state's claim of juris-
diction over a nonresident individual engaged in selling securities within the state.
The Court sustained the jurisdiction as a reasonable exercise of the state's power to
regulate an activity which affected the economic interest of its citizens.
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See text page 208 supra. The Court in stating the
due process requirement obviously is including both nonresident corporations and
individuals.
45. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In the words of Justice Black: "Looking back over
this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.
...At the same time modern transportation and communications have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity." (Emphasis added.) The implication is clear that the Court is
considering nonresident individuals in the same category as nonresident corporations.
46. See note 16 supra.
47. The notice must be reasonably calculated to inforni tile parties of the suit.
Cf. Walker v. City of I ttchingson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950).
48. See international Shoe Co. v. Vashington. 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945),
49. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
50. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957).
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Paragraph two of the statute, the amendment enacted by the 1957 legis-
lature, states:
Any person, firm or corporation which through brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors sells, consigns, or leases, . . - tangible
or intangible personal property to any person, firm or corporation
in this state, shall be conclusively presumed to be operating,
conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business or business
venture in this state. (Emphasis added.)
The statute provides for notification of the nonresident by sending
by registered mail a notice of the service upon the secretary of state and
a copy of the process. The defendant's return receipt, and an affidavit of
the plaintiff or his attorney of such action must be filed with the papers
in the case within a specified period of time".
The jurisdictional basis in the Florida statute is probably as compre-
hensive as that thus far enacted by any other state. There is reason, however,
to believe, after the McGee decision, that the statute in its entirety will
survive the constitutional test. It should be noted that the Florida statute
is subject to the same general criticism applicable to all substituted service
statutes. There is no constitutional basis for substituted service today. The
fictionalized agency concept as a method of circumventing the lack of
actual presence of a nonresident defendant within the forum in effectuating
personal service of process is functus officio. The requirement of the
statute that service be upon the secretary of state, as far as any federal
constitutional requirement is concerned, is mere surplusage. If the non-
resident defendant has actual notice of the suit and a reasonable opportunity
to defend the requirement of the fourteenth amendment as to due process
has been complied with. -2 Actual notice in the view of the Supreme
Court can be accomplished by service by registered mail." It is worthy
of note that in the McGee case no mention is made of the service upon
the Insurance Commissioner of California. On the contrary the Court
stated: "Respondent was not served with process in California but by
registered mail at its principal place of business in Texas."5 4 Here is a
complete negation of any requirement of substituted service upon a
fictionalized agent present within the state.
Florida Decisions Construing the Florida Statute.
The comprehensive scope of the Florida statute has been matched
by the liberality of the Florida Supreme Court in its construction and
application. Looking backward, its decisions seem to have been uncannily
51. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 provides for service of process in accordance with FLA.
STAT. § 47.30 (1957).
52. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.. 355 U. S. 220 (1957).
53. Iless v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
54. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
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anticipatory of tie holding of the United States Supreme Court in McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co.5' The Florida court in three decisions has
spccificaily interpreted paragraph one of the statute.
In State ex rel. Weber v. Register6 decided in 1953, a nonresident
individual purchased an orange grove and operated it as a business venture
in Florida. Subsequently lie caused it to be listed with the plaintiff, a
Florida real estate broker. The plaintiff sued for his commission on the
ground that he had a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy, but that
the defendant had refused to complete the sale. The Florida Supreme Court
held that the listing of the property was not part of the business of operating
an orange grove, but the purchase of the grove and the listing of it for sale
was a business venture within the meaning of the Florida statute."' One year
later, in State ex rel. Guardian Indemnity Corp. v. Harrison,s the court
decided that a foreign corporation was engaged in a business or business
venture within tie state of Florida where the corporation fumished its
"brokers" with instructions and supplies for use in presenting a certain
"credit indemnity plan" to clients and made contracts with these clients
to be performed in Florida.
Win. E. Strasser Const. Corp. v. Linn 9 is the latest decision in which
the Florida Supreme Court defines what constitutes "doing business in
Florida." Individual nonresidents of the state, through their attorney in
fact, a resident of New York, entered into a construction contract with a
Florida corporation. The contract covered the construction of an apartment
building on a lot previously acquired in Miami. The contractor, alleging
money due as a result of a breach of the contract, brought suit in Florida.
Service was obtained upon the nonresident individual under the Florida
substituted service statute."' The supreme court held that the investment
in the real estate and the execution of the construction contract plus
the expressed intent of operating an apartment rental business in Florida
constituted doing business in Florida within the meaning of the statute.
The decision of the Florida Supreme Court in the Weber case has
been criticized by some legal writers.6 ' Unless one adopts the position that
the McGee case formulates a rule which is only applicable to insurance
companies or "businesses in which the state has a special interest," the
55. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
56. 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
57. Id. at 621. The court stated: "We are constrained to the.view that petitioners
engaged in a business venture within the State of Florida when they made a contract
with respondent Driver in and by which they employed him as a real estate broker
to find a person, or persons, ready, able and willing to purchase the citrus grove owned
by petitioners in this state which contract is enforceable in this jurisdiction." (Emphasis
added. See FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957).
5. 74 So.2d 371 (1954).
59. 97 So.2d 458 (1957).
60. See note 51 supra.
61. Dambach, supra note 7, at 220; Stern, Conflict of Laws, 8 NhMIIA L. Q. 209,
214-216 (1954).
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criticisms lost their validity with the rendition of that decisioa. Certainly
a real estate sales contract with a Florida real estate broker for the sale of
Florida real estate should be construed as having a "substantial connection"
with the state of Florida. The minimun contact can be a single transaction
if the court, as it did in the \Veber case, construes such a transaction to
be within the purview of the statute.
The decisions in the Guardian and Strasser cases are sustainable on
the basis of the International Shoe doctrine. In each of those decisions a
course of conduct was involved which did not require judicial imagination
to bring them within the realm of "doing business" or engaging in a
"business venture" in Florida.
Florida Judgments and "Full Faith and Credit."
In Berknman v. Ann Lewis Shops" '-' a court of another jurisdiction was
asked to give "full faith and credit" to a Florida judgment wherein
jurisdiction of a nonresident was obtained under the substituted service
statute. 3  A federal district court iu New York held that ownership of a
subsidiary corporation in Florida did not constitute doing business by the
parent corporation in Florida within the meaning of the Florida statute,
even though concededly the parent sold merchandise to the subsidiary for
resale. The court quoted from a decision of the court of appeals of the
fourth circuit:
It cannot be said that a corporation is doing business within a
state merely because a wholly owned subsidiary is selling its products
there, if the separate corporate entities are observed and the
subsidiary has purchased the goods it is selling and is not selling
them as agent of the manufacturer.A4
The federal court's decision was rendered prior to the enactment of
paragraph two of the Florida statute. 5 The court's holding was based
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co.", and previous decisions of the Florida Supreme Court construing
section 47.16 of the Florida Statutes.67 The court, however, went on to state:
This is not to say that a statute might not constitutionally be
drawn which would make the presence in a state of a foreign
corporation sufficient basis to assert jurisdiction over the parent
company. All that the due process clause would require is that
the defendant 'have certain minimum contacts with [the territory
62. 142 F. Supp. 417 (1956).
63. See note 51 supra.
64. Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955).
65. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (2) was enacted by the 1957 legislature.
66. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
67. The court examined the construction placed upon the statute by the Florida
Supreme Court in Guardian Indemnity Corp. v. Harrison, 74 So.2d 371 (1954), and
Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (1953).
68. BerkMan v. Ann Lewis Shops, 142 F. Supp. 417, 422 (1956).
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of the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'a"
Uidcr paragraph two of the Florida statute 0 it is believed the Florida
courts would have jurisdiction. The subsidiary in this case was distributing
for the parent corporation and thus would fall squarely within the provision
that "Any . .. corporation which through . . . or distributors sells . . .
tangible of intangible personal property to any person, firm or corporation
in this state, shall be conclusively presumed" to be doing business in
Florida.70 "Minimum contacts" would certainly be satisfied within the
McGee concept.
HANSON V. DENCKLA -A RESTRICTION OF TIlE MCGEE DECISION?
Anyone who reads the recent decision of the Court in Hanson v.
Denckla7' must have a feeling of nostalgia for the merry-go-round of his
childhood. The Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, in discussing
the implications of the McGee decision stated:
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on personal jurisdiction of state courts ....
Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal
contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise
of power-over him. 2 (Emphasis added.)
And later in distinguishing the McGee case the Court continued:
[T]he State [California] had enacted special legislation . . . to
exercise what McGee called its 'manifest interest' in providing
effective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents
engaged in an activity that the state treats as exceptional and
subjects to special regulation."
What does the Court mean? Does inconvenient and distant litigation
immunize a nonresident defendant, corporate or individual, against the
assertion of a state's jurisdiction regardless of the quality or quantity of
the contacts, or is the quality and quantity of the contacts to be construed
to override the convenience of the defendant, or is weight to be given
to each and the limits of a state's territorial jurisdiction determined on
this basis? Again, does the Court intend to say that the McGee decision
is limited to businesses which the state treats as exceptional and subjects
69, FLA. STAT. § 47.16(2) (1957).
70. FLA. STAT. § 47.16(2) (1957).
71. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 253.
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to special legislation, or does it apply where it is to the manifest interest
of the state to protect its residents but the business is not exceptional
and not subjected to special regulation-the "doing business" statutes?
Some legal writers have interpreted the McGee decision to mean a
virtual demise of any substantial restriction upon a state's jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants, assuming the requisite contact.7 4 Courts have
applied the rule laid down in the light of the broad language of the deci-
sion. 5 Is the Court now trying to restrict the application of the rule?
Admittedly what is being discussed here is largely dicta. The answer to
that is "remember Pennoyer v. Neff."
One thing is clear: state legislatures in enacting jurisdictional statutes,
and state courts in their construction and application must weigh the
implications of Hanson v. Denckla when applying the rule of McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co."5 The necessary minimum contact must always
be present to give the state a jurisdictional basis not violative of the due
process requirement of the fourteenth amendment. But, assuming the
requisite contact, the Hanson case seems to imply that the question of
whether the litigation is inconvenient or distant for the defendant is to
be given added weight in determining whether assertion of jurisdiction
by the state deprives the defendant of due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States makes
it difficult to evaluate the present status of a state's jurisdiction in actions
in pcrsonam where the basis is the business of a nonresident done within
74. See, e.g., Wilson, In Personamn Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: An Invitation
And A Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 363 (1958); Hoffman, The Plastic Frontiers of
State Judicial Power Over Non-Residents: McGee v. International Life Insurance
Company, 24 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 291 (1957-58); Ellnann, supra note 2: Freeman,
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. And The Amenability of Foreign
Corporations To Suit, 13 Bs. LAw 515 (1958); Reese, Judicial jurisdiction over
Non-Residents; The Impact of McGee v. International Life insurance Company, 13
Re. Ass'N BAR CITY OF N.Y. 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (1958).
75. See, e.g., W.S.A.Z. v. Lyons (6th Cir. 1958) (Virginia television station held
to be doing business in Kentucky where it sought advertising contracts in Kentucky
which were performed by televising to certain areas of Kentucky. The nonresident
corporation was subjected to substituted service of process in libel action in Kentucky
growing out of news broadcast.); Pugh v. Oklahoma Farn Bureau Mlut. Inc. Co.,
159 F.Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1958) (District court held that a direct action in
Louisiana, under Louisiana statute permitting service of process on nonresident
liability insurance company through secretary of state, against Oklahoma liability
insurer issuing a policy to an Oklahoma resident covering a car later involved in an
accident in Louisiana, did not violate due process or equal protection of the law.
'he Oklahoma insurer had not registered or qualified to do business in Louisiana.);
Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co .......... S.C ---------- 102 S.E. 2d 743 (1958)
(Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a South Carolina statute authorizing
service of process upon insurance commissioner in action against foreign insurer did
not violate insurer's constitutional rights, though foreign insurer's only contact with
the state's resident consisted of issuance and delivery by mail of a single policy. Each
of the foregoing decisions cited the McGee decision.
VOL. XIII
19581 COMMENTS 217
its boundaries. The decision in the McGee case led many to falsely assume
that national service of process was just around the corner. It it accomplishes
nothing else, the dicta in the Hanson case will serve to dispel this illusion.
It appears that any territorial limitation placed upon a state's juris-
diction in actions in personam predicated upon business of a nonresident
done within the forum, proceeds on a false premise. The nonresident of
his own volition chooses to avail himself of the privilege extended by the
state's statute governing doing business within the state. When litigation
arises as a result of these transactions, why should due process shelter
the nonresident?
Joel H. Dowdy
